Podos A lightweight container platform Early development · not released

Operations

Security model

A container platform crosses a strong security boundary. Podos puts correctness and isolation ahead of convenience. This page describes what protects what today, and what is still missing.

The daemon runs as root

Available The daemon runs as root, like Docker and Kubernetes by default. Root lets it mount overlay filesystems, set cgroup limits, create networks and firewall rules (Available) and listen on ports 80 and 443 (Available). The cost: a bug in the daemon can give an attacker the whole server. The daemon therefore had an internal security review as part of M4 (Available); no high-severity finding is open. It has not had an independent audit.

Who can talk to the daemon

Available By default the only way in to the API is the Unix socket /run/podos/podos.sock:

Anyone who is root on the server can do everything. Available The daemon can also serve a remote HTTPS API with scoped, revocable tokens; it is off unless you pass --listen. See the next sections.

Tokens and scopes

Available Remote requests carry a bearer token.

A deploy token can read its environment's secrets indirectly, through the containers it deploys: a container can print its own environment. Grant deploy tokens as you would grant access to the secrets of that environment.

Remote connections and the CA

Available

Limits: there is no CA rotation yet, and HTTP proxies are not supported for server connections.

Web UI

Available The web UI is served by the daemon.

Limits: the UI has no second factor, and a token typed into a page on a compromised computer is lost like any token. Use tokens with a narrow scope and an expiry for people who only need to look.

A repository cannot redirect your deploy

Available A manifest can name a context for an environment. The manifest may come from a repository you did not write, and the context holds a token for a real server. So the first time a manifest selects a context for a project, the CLI shows the context, the address and the project and asks you to type yes, then remembers the choice. Without a terminal it refuses unless you pass --context NAME. The key holds a context name only, never an address or a token, and is not uploaded. See Environments and overrides.

Every command that talks to a remote server also prints which context and URL it uses before it sends anything.

Containers

Available Each container runs with:

Available Each project and environment pair has its own private network. Other projects and environments are never reachable unless shared explicitly (planned for 0.3). Services are private by default; they are exposed only through domains or publish. Containers can reach the internet and, by default, the server's private networks. An operator can turn on strict egress with podos setup --strict-egress and list the exceptions with --allow-egress. The cloud metadata address is always blocked. Available Containers can never reach 169.254.0.0/16 (which holds the metadata address of AWS, GCP and others), 168.63.129.16 (Azure), 100.100.100.200 (Alibaba Cloud) or 192.0.0.192 (Oracle Cloud), not even in strict egress mode with an allow-list. Containers can use TCP, UDP and ping over IPv4 and Unix sockets, but no raw sockets, packet capture or SCTP; IPv6 inside application networks is off. A service without resources.memory gets 512 MiB. Podos refuses to create containers when the data disk has less than 1 GiB or 5% of inodes free.

Ingress and TLS

Available

Not yet

Images

Available

Builds on the server

Available A build runs your Dockerfile on the server, so its steps are untrusted code. What limits them:

The install script (Available) downloads over HTTPS only and checks crun, conmon and BuildKit against SHA-256 values pinned in the script, and the podos binary against the SHA-256 published with the release; a mismatch stops it before anything is installed. The systemd unit it writes runs the daemon with NoNewPrivileges, no core dumps, a limited set of socket families and a reduced capability bounding set. It drops, among others, the capabilities to load kernel modules, reboot, set the system time and read the audit log. The daemon looks up its helper programs (crun, conmon, buildkitd, buildctl and others) in /usr/local/lib/podos/bin and then the system directories, never in the caller's PATH. It uses a program only when it is an executable regular file that group and others cannot write, and, when it runs as root, when root owns the file and the directories above it.

Secrets

Available

Available Secret files (podos file set --secret, see Files in containers) follow the same rules:

Limits of this protection:

Input

Available Names, image references, paths, env values and container output are treated as untrusted. The manifest is parsed strictly, values are never passed through a shell, and terminal output is cleaned of control characters (podos logs --raw turns that off for pipes).

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security problems privately to the maintainers, not in a public issue. A security contact will be published with the first release.